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Changing Agricultural Marketing Channel Structures: 
Interdependences & Risk Preferences 
 
50 Word Summary 
 
We propose a conceptual model that integrates transaction cost and risk behavior theories 
in an interdependence framework. An empirical research design is proposed to test the 
conceptual model within the context of the broiler and grain industries using structural 
equation modeling.  
 
Abstract 
We propose a conceptual model that integrates transaction cost and risk behavior theories 
in an interdependence framework. Hypotheses are offered that relate the concepts that are 
central to the proposed model to the three dimensions of channel structures: the 
allocations of uncertainty, decision rights, and gains. An empirical research design is 
proposed to test the validity of the conceptual model within the context of the broiler and 
grain industries. The conceptual model will be validated in a structural equation modeling 
framework.   2
Changing Agricultural Marketing Channel Structures: 
Interdependences & Risk Preferences 
Rapid changes in the structure and organization of marketing channels draw attention 
from policymakers, economists, and industry stakeholders. Agricultural marketing 
channels provide a fertile research context, as such changes differ within and across 
agricultural and food sectors, e.g., commodity vs. branded products, grains vs. hogs 
(Lajili, et al., 1997). Transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) has 
identified several factors that influence the extent of vertical coordination (Hobbs, 1997; 
Lajili, et al., 1997), and has influenced the theory of channel member interdependence 
(Stern and Reve, 1980, and Achrol, Reve, and Stern, 1983). Yet, the transaction cost 
model’s low predictive power for classifying firms by channel choices suggests that the 
model may be incomplete (Klein, Frazier, and Roth, 1990). Pennings and Wansink 
(2004) show that suppliers’ and buyers’ contractual relationships can be partly explained 
by the interaction of risk attitudes and risk perceptions (IRAP) of channel members and 
the perceived power relationships amongst channel members.  
We examine the factors that drive marketing channel structures and the relations 
between these factors. These factors may be helpful in explaining the different marketing 
channel structures that exist in agriculture and in understanding how agricultural 
marketing channels change over time. Following Cheung (1983), we conjecture that the 
nature of contractual relations determine the channel structure. Three dimensions of 
contractual relationships, i.e., the allocation of uncertainty, the allocation of decision 
rights, and the allocation of gains from trade, indicate the extent of vertical coordination 
(Sykuta and Cook, 2001). These three interrelated dimensions are the dependent variables   3
of the proposed model, which integrates key variables from transaction cost theory with 
risk behavior theory in an interdependence framework.  
Agricultural economics research has examined individuals’ attributes and 
perceived transaction costs to explain producers’ choices of outlets (Hobbs, 1997) and 
contracts (Lajili, et al., 1997). We focus on channel structure formation. While the 
previous literature incorporates elements of perceived risk, the interaction of risk attitudes 
and perceptions are not explicitly modeled. Nor are the interdependences between 
channel members. We include the interaction between channel members’ risk attitudes 
and risk perceptions (Pennings and Wansink, 2004) and the interdependences between 
channel members (Stern and Reve, 1980, and Achrol, Reve, and Stern, 1983) as 
explanatory variables in a model of market channel formation. The conceptual model will 
be evaluated for two differently structured marketing channels: the highly coordinated 
broiler industry and the generally less coordinated grain industry.
1 This research design 
may help ascertain the applicability of the proposed conceptual model and enables testing 
the robustness of the conceptual model. 
This paper is organized as follows. First we review the relevant literature from the 
(agricultural) economics and marketing fields. We then present the conceptual model in 
which we integrate the transaction costs, risk behavior, and interdependence theories and 
formulate hypotheses that relate the concepts from these theoretical frameworks to the 
three dimensions of channel structures: the allocation of uncertainty, decision rights and 
gains. Subsequently, we describe the decision context for which we wish to validate the 
conceptual model, discuss the research design, and offer suggestions for future research. 
 
                                                 
1 Stern and Reve (1980) call for systematic comparisons of marketing channels across or within industries.   4
1. Marketing Channel Literature   
Marketing channel literature, which remains fragmented into economic and behavioral 
approaches, has long neglected the maintenance, adaptation, and evolution of marketing 
channels, and has offered little empirical evidence that validates the proposed theories 
(Stern and Reve, 1980).  As marketing channels are sets of interdependent organizations 
that make a product or service for use or consumption (Stern, El-Ansary, and Coughlan, 
1996), the interdependence of channel members has been emphasized in marketing 
literature (Geyskens, et. al., 1996). Interdependence theory has drawn on transaction cost 
theory. The conventional focus of both transaction cost and interdependence theories has 
been on transactions.
2 These similar, but operationally different, approaches can be 
further complemented with concepts from the risk behavior literature, such as Pennings 
and Wansink’s (2004) interaction of risk aversion and risk perception (IRAP) concept.   
Below we review three theoretical frameworks that have been used to understand 
channel marketing structures. We begin by discussing transaction cost theory, followed 
by interdependence and risk behavior theories. The first two have been used extensively 
in marketing and agricultural economics literature. The latter has only scarcely been used 
to understand marketing channel structures. 
 
1.1. Transaction Cost Theory 
While several definitions have been offered, transaction costs are simply (and 
tautologically) the costs incurred when organizing economic exchange (i.e., transacting).
3 
                                                 
2 The transaction is the unit of analysis in transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975), while the marketing 
literature concentrates on the relationship between two trade parties (Achrol, Reve, and Stern, 1983).  
3 Transaction costs encompass the costs of running economic and social systems (Furubotn and Richter, 
2000). The costs of contracting are ex-ante transaction costs, e.g., search and information costs; drafting,   5
Human factors, like bounded rationality and opportunism, coupled with environmental 
factors, such as uncertainty, complexity, and the concentration (i.e., small numbers 
bargaining) of input and output markets are the sources of these costs (Williamson, 1975; 
Mahoney, 1992). Opportunistic behavior (i.e., self-interest seeking with guile) is more 
likely to prevail when information is asymmetric (i.e., unequally possessed). If positive 
transaction costs exist, property rights and the organization of exchange (ranging from 
pure market governance to complete vertical ownership with hierarchical governance) 
matter for achieving efficient economic outcomes (Mahoney, 2005). Thus, the 
organizational form realized economizes on these costs. Transaction costs are often 
dimensionalized in terms of asset specificity and uncertainty (Mahoney, 1992).
4 
 
1.1.1 Asset Specificity 
Asset specificity is an asset’s degree of specialization (Lajili, et. al., 1997).  Higher levels 
of asset specificity suggest greater threats of opportunistic behavior and encourage 
increased vertical integration (Mahoney, 1992). Williamson (1985) notes that specific 
assets may be physical (e.g., specialized tools and equipment), human (e.g., firm-specific 
knowledge), or locational (e.g., co-location of an electric plant and a coal mine).  
Investment in specific assets offers ex-ante screening benefits, as well as ex-post bonding 
benefits that render agreements self-enforcing.  Willingness to invest in a specific asset, 
which may have low salvage value outside of the relationship, is a signal of a desirable 
                                                                                                                                                 
bargaining, and decision costs; and costs of safeguarding an agreement, and ex-post transaction costs, e.g., 
monitoring and enforcement costs; adaptation and haggling costs; bonding costs; and maladaptation costs 
(Mahoney, 1992). 
4 A positive relationship between frequency of transactions and vertical integration has been hypothesized 
(Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984). Mahoney (1992) suggests that frequency influences the extent of 
vertical integration only at intermediate levels of asset specificity. Thus, we do not account for frequency.   6
trade partner. Though many alternative trade partners may exist at the onset of an 
exchange relationship, bonding effects transform contractual renegotiations into small 
numbers bargaining situations.
5 Hence, potential trade partners should grant mutual 
hostages (i.e., each should make relationship-specific investments) to insure against 
future vulnerability to opportunistic behavior by the other party (Williamson, 1983).   
 
1.1.2 Uncertainty 
 Mahoney’s (1992) review of empirical transaction cost studies reveals that uncertainty 
about input supply, output demand, and volume (e.g., sales growth volatility) encourage 
vertical coordination, which is a means of transferring risk (Mahoney, 1992).
6 These 
uncertainties directly impact the level and volatility of (net) cash flows of channel 
members.  Mahoney (1992, p. 562) states, “Firms integrate to ensure a supply of input for 
their ‘high probability’ demand and continue to purchase their ‘low probability’ 
demand.” While uncertainties due to fluctuations in up- or down-stream firms’ selling 
and purchasing behavior can be limited by tighter coordination, uncertainties from 
aggregate market demand fluctuations can only be transferred.  
 
1.2. Interdependence Theory 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p.40), “Interdependence exists whenever one 
actor does not entirely control all of the conditions necessary for the achievement of an 
                                                 
5 The potential partner to a trade relationship that has fewer alternative trade partners to choose from is 
more vulnerable to opportunism by its chosen partner.  Asset specificity implies small numbers bargaining, 
but the reverse is not necessarily true (Mahoney, 2005). 
6 Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986) find that uncertainty regarding the rate of technological change is 
negatively associated with vertical integration. We assume that agricultural producers primarily face cash 
flow uncertainties due to fluctuations in production and demand, and do not account for this effect.   7
action or for obtaining the outcome desired from the action.” Buchanan (1992) suggests 
that interdependence is two or more organizations having to take each other into account 
to accomplish their goals. From a transaction cost perspective, Dwyer and Oh (1988) 
suggest that interdependence refers to parties that are not bound in the classical 
contractual sense, but by informal and tacit agreements; each sharing expectations for 
continued beneficial exchange due to knowledge of the other’s preferences and 
capabilities.    
Stern and Reve’s (1980) proposed political economy framework and Achrol, 
Reve, and Stern’s (1983) dyadic approach have become ingrained in interdependence 
theory.
7 The former allows sociopolitical and economic forces to be analyzed in consort, 
while the latter allows meaningful linkages between paired channel members and sources 
of uncertainty in their environment. Trade relationships are described in terms of (1) their 
place on the continuum between market and hierarchical transactions (economic 
structure); (2) what decision-making mechanisms are used to establish the terms of trade 
(economic process); (3) whether a power-dependence relationship is minimal, balanced, 
imbalanced, or centralized (political structure); and (4) what type of sentiments and 
behaviors (cooperative or conflictive) typify their interactions (political process). The 
interdependence structure of a dyadic relationship comprises each party’s dependence, 
the magnitude of their total interdependence, and the extent of interdependence 
asymmetry between them (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp, 1995). 
 
                                                 
7 A marketing channel’s internal economic and political structures and processes is its internal political 
economy (Stern and Reve, 1980). The prevailing and prospective economic environment and the 
sociopolitical system in which a channel operates is its external political economy. Internal and external 
political economies influence each other via adaptation and interaction processes. Etgar’s (1977) empirical 
results suggest that internal, rather than external, political economies largely explain channel operation.   8
1.2.1 Dependence 
Dependence is a firm’s need to maintain a trade relationship to achieve desired goals 
(Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994), and is indicated by the replaceability of a firm’s existing 
partner (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp, 1995 p. 349).
8 The irreplaceability of a trade 
partner is ever-apparent when few potential trade partners exist, i.e., an 
oligopoly/oligopsony, and, in the extreme, a monopoly/monopsony (Buchanan, 1992).  
Patterns of channel power-dependence relations are associated with channel members’ 
dominant sentiments and behaviors, which are dimensionalized as cooperation and 
conflict (Stern and Reve, 1980).  
 
1.2.2. Interdependence Magnitude and Asymmetry 
The magnitude of total interdependence, reflecting the amount of attention that trade 
partners give to their relationship, is the sum of both party’s dependence, whereas relative 
interdependence asymmetry, the comparative level of dependence between trade partners, 
is their difference (Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994). Higher magnitudes of interdependence, 
reflecting either greater complementarities between partners’ resources, fewer alternative 
suppliers of resources, higher levels of asset specificity, or greater uncertainties, are 
associated with increased cooperation and vertical coordination. 
Citing Williamson (1985), Buchanan (1992) confers that credible commitments 
(e.g., specific investments of low salvage value) increase trade partners’ magnitude of 
interdependence. Her description of potential trade partners weighing the marginal 
                                                 
8 Dependence and power are two sides of the same coin (Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994). While the abuse of 
market power is cause for concern (and may be overcome by vertically integrating the consecutive links 
along the value-added chain), economists attach no negative connotation to market power itself, as the 
downward slope of a demand curve reflects its existence (Frank and Bernanke, 2001).   9
benefits from the existing resources and specific investments of the other partner versus 
their own costs of investing in the relationship is reminiscent of Teece’s (1986) resource-
based distinction between complementary and co-specialized (i.e., specific) assets. If 
potential partners possess complementary assets, coordinating their use enhances value 
generation, suggesting a high magnitude of interdependence.  The relative scarcity of 
access to such resources for each party (i.e., large vs. small numbers bargaining), affects 
who values the relationship more (Williamson, 1975, and Mahoney, 1992). The party that 
values the relationship more is relatively dependent on the other, and may make specific 
investments that increase the potential partner’s valuation, but also increase its own 
dependence on that partner (Buchanan, 1992).  Also, a channel member facing substantial 
environmental uncertainties may highly value a relationship with a partner that is better 
suited to cope with the uncertainty (Achrol, Reve, and Stern, 1983). 
 
1.2.3. Interdependence and Vertical Coordination 
Vertical coordination requires cooperation, regardless of whether cooperation is achieved 
by coercive or noncoercive means (Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994).  As relationships with 
low magnitudes of interdependence warrant neither the time, effort, nor opportunity cost 
of extensive interaction, further coordination is often foregone (Gundlach and Cadotte, 
1994). In general, closer vertical linkages are associated with higher magnitudes of 
interdependence which facilitate cooperation (Stern and Reve, 1980). Yet, cooperation in 
high magnitude relationships can be complicated by asymmetry. From the benevolent 
perspective, the exercise of power via noncoercive means is thought to aid in 
coordination, adaptation, and goal attainment, encouraging cooperation and mitigating   10
opportunistic tendencies (Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994). However, Korpi (1974) claims 
that slight power imbalances may yield conflict, while Williamson (1975) maintains that 
centralized power may induce cooperation.
9 These claims support the opportunistic 
perspective that a power advantage manifests exploitative tendencies (Gundlach and 
Cadotte, 1994), and that coercion may serve to institutionalize and legitimize power 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Though cooperation in such cases is likely different from 
that found in balanced power relationships, centralized planning has emerged via 
cooperative efforts in symmetric relationships (Stern and Reve, 1980).  
The literature reviewed above suggests that vertical coordination is less likely for 
low, rather than high, magnitude relationships. Furthermore, equitable sharing of gains 
from coordination and evenhanded distribution of decision rights bearing on the 
exchange appear more likely when interdependence is of a high magnitude and 
symmetric, rather than asymmetric.  The distribution of uncertainty in vertically 
coordinated relationships will depend on the partners’ relative perception of and attitude 
toward the risk.  
 
1.3 Risk Behavior Theory 
The uncertainties associated with sales volumes, supply of inputs, demand for outputs, 
and (by extension) with cash flows are an important component of the transaction cost 
theory (Williamson, 1975). Supply and demand uncertainties are considered 
environmental factors in interdependence theory (Achrol, Reve, and Stern, 1983). Neither 
                                                 
9 “A relative power advantage within a channel is often used to program channel activities and in such 
situations, decision making with respect to at least certain functions (e.g., promotion, physical distribution) 
tend to be centralized” (Stern and Reve, 1980, p. 59). For instance, a channel member that is more capable 
of coping with or absorbing uncertainty will initiate vertical coordination with a relatively less capable, and 
hence, more dependent partner (Achrol, Reve, and Stern, 1983).     11
transaction cost theory nor interdependence theory explicitly address channel members’ 
awareness (i.e., perception) of and attitude toward risk.
10  
A channel member must first perceive or identify risk in order to respond to it. 
Risk perception reflects the channel member’s interpretation of the likelihood of 
exposure to the content of the risk (e.g., price fluctuations) and is defined as a channel 
member’s assessment of the risk inherent in a particular situation (Pennings, Wansink, 
and Meulenberg, 2002). The perceived risk may differ across channel members.  How 
channel members cope with perceived risk will depend on their risk attitude (i.e., their 
general or consistent predisposition toward risk). It is important to emphasize that risk 
perception and risk attitude are two different concepts. Risk perception deals with the 
channel member’s interpretation of the likelihood of being exposed to the content of a 
particular risk, whereas risk attitude deals with the channel member’s interpretation of the 
content of the risk and how much he or she dislikes risk.  
The notable work of Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) provides insight into the 
relationships between risk perceptions and risk attitudes, and risk behavior. In Pratt and 
Arrow’s work, risk management, reflected in the risk premium, is a function of risk 
aversion and the variance in additional wealth.  Pennings, Wansink and Meulenberg 
(2002) showed that the Pratt and Arrow framework implies that the interaction between 
risk attitude and risk perception (the latter reflected in the variance of additional wealth) 
drives the risk premium and hence, risk behavior.  
The interaction between the two concepts become apparent if one realizes that, 
regardless of a channel member’s risk attitude, a channel member will not change his or 
                                                 
10 Here, we do not make Knight’s (1921) distinction between risk (randomness with knowable 
probabilities) and uncertainty (randomness with unknowable probabilities), since within our channel 
context it is often unknown whether the probabilities are known or not.   12
her behavior if no risk is perceived in a given situation. When risk-averse channel 
members perceive risk, they will exhibit behavior that decreases their risk exposure. The 
interaction between risk attitude and risk perception, hereafter referred to as IRAP, 
represents how the channel member intends to cope with risks perceived in the channel, 
along with the risks his or her own actions generate.  Following Pennings and Wansink 
(2004) we define IRAP as positive when channel members perceive risk and are risk 
averse. We define it as negative when channel members perceive risk and are risk 
seeking. We define it as zero when channel members either do not perceive any risk or 
when they are risk neutral. A channel member’s IRAP profile reveals how he or she is 
going to react to the uncertainty. It also reflects channel members’ predispositions to 
dealing with the risks inherent to the stimuli they receive and the risks their actions 
generate. In this paper, we integrate the IRAP concept with the uncertainty concepts in 
transaction costs and interdependence theories to explain how channel members allocate 
uncertainty.  
 
2. Conceptual Model 
Much of the economic and marketing literature on marketing channels concerns the 
extent of vertical integration (i.e., the boundaries of the firm). We concur with Cheung’s 
(1983) reasoning that the nature of contractual relations, rather than what constitutes a 
firm (i.e., where the firm begins and ends), is the matter of importance. Sykuta and Cook 
(2001) list three economic components of every transaction relationship; the allocation of 
uncertainty, the allocation of property rights to decisions bearing on the relationship, and 
the allocation of gains from trade. These three interrelated dimensions indicate the extent   13
of vertical coordination, and are explained by integrating concepts from interdependence, 
transaction costs, and risk behavior theories (Figure 1). 
 
2.1. Integrating Transaction Cost, Interdependence, and Risk Behavior Theories 
As noted earlier, transaction cost theory’s main explanatory variables are asset specificity 
and uncertainty (Mahoney, 1992). Both have been identified as influencing the 
magnitude and symmetry of interdependence between dyad members, the central 
concepts of interdependence theory (Buchanan, 1992). While the level of relationship-
specific investments (i.e., asset specificity) is clearly part of the dyad’s internal structure, 
uncertainty is considered an environmental factor, and thus external to the dyad.  
The more uncertain the dyad’s environment, the higher the magnitude of 
interdependence is.  The greater the disparity between the levels of uncertainty faced by 
channel members (and between their relative ability to manage that uncertainty), the 
greater the asymmetry of interdependence between them. Similarly, greater levels of 
relationship-specific investment and disparity in the level of such investment by each 
dyad member are associated, respectively, with higher magnitude and asymmetry of 
interdependence, through interactive feedback relationships. While transaction cost and 
interdependence theories identify the importance of uncertainty, both neglect that channel 
members’ decisions on how to manage the uncertainty that they “face” is related is to the 
interaction of their risk perceptions and risk attitudes (IRAP). That is, the way that 
channel members respond to uncertainty depends on the channel members’ IRAP 
profiles, which thus, influence the allocation of uncertainty within the channel.    14
The integration of the theories is displayed in Figure 1, which shows how the 
concepts of the three theories influence each other and how they drive the dimensions of 
channel structure. IRAP influences the allocation of uncertainty directly and the 
allocations of decision rights and gains from trade indirectly through its affects on 
interdependence magnitude and asymmetry. Transaction cost theory holds that asset 
specificity engenders vertical integration, as a means of mitigating exposure to 
opportunism (Mahoney, 1992). Actually, asset specificity is one of the factors influencing 
interdependence magnitude and asymmetry and thus, contributing to the power-
dependence relationships that enable one channel member to take advantage of another. 
Hence, asset specificity indirectly affects the allocations of decision rights and gains from 
trade through its impact on the interdependence structure of the dyad. 
  
2.2 Development of Hypotheses 
Following Stern and Reve (1980) and Achrol, Reve, and Stern (1983) we evaluate the 
interdependence structure of a channel dyad in terms of its internal and external political 
economies from a producer perspective.  This allows modeling of the interactions of the 
dyadic relationship within the uncertain channel environment.   
The interdependence magnitude and symmetry of a dyad reflect the importance of 
the relationship to both parties to the dyad (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp, 1995). If 
both parties desperately need the relationship to achieve their goals, then interdependence 
magnitude is high. A party’s valuation of the relationship depends on (1) how well the 
other’s existing resources complement its own, (2) the availability of alternative sources 
of those and similar resources, and (3) the potential benefits from mitigating or   15
transferring uncertainty within the relationship (Buchanan, 1992). As lower uncertainties 
regarding the supply of inputs to the channel dyad and the demand for its outputs provide 
fewer incentives for cooperation and suggest a lower magnitude of interdependence 
(Achrol, Reve, and Stern, 1983), we hypothesize that 
 
H1a  Higher (lower) perceived levels of environmental (e.g., supply and demand, and 
thus, cash flow) uncertainties are positively related to higher (lower) magnitudes 
of interdependence, ceteris paribus.   
 
The above hypothesized relationship is expected, assuming that both of the dyad parties 
are not simultaneously risk-seeking and disregarding asset specificity and the 
complementarities between each party’s resources. Furthermore, under these conditions, 
higher perceived uncertainty by either party to the dyad tends to increase interdependence 
asymmetry. According to Achrol, Reve, and Stern (1983, p. 63), “The higher the 
uncertainty in the input or output sectors of the task environment of marketing channel 
dyads, the greater the efforts towards increasing the level of vertical coordination within 
the dyad.” Vertical coordination is initiated by the channel member that is more capable 
of coping with or absorbing the uncertainty. High uncertainty in the input (output) sector 
induces backward (forward) vertical coordination, which is initiated by the less 
dependent partner who is better suited to cope with the uncertainty. We hypothesize that 
   16
H2a  Higher relative uncertainty on either the supply or the demand side of the dyad 
engenders higher interdependence asymmetry, ceteris paribus. Disregarding risk 
attitudes, the party facing the relatively higher perceived level of uncertainty is 
the relatively dependent party. 
 
Pennings and Wansink (2004) explain risk behavior using the interaction of risk attitude 
and risk perception (IRAP), defined as positive when a channel member perceives risk 
and is risk averse; negative when a channel member perceives risk and is risk seeking; 
and zero when a channel member either does not perceive any risk or is risk neutral. 
Given this definition and assuming either risk-neutrality or -aversion for one dyad 
member, we can redefine H1a and H2a, respectively, in terms of the other’s (in our 
research context, the producer’s) IRAP value as
11 
 
H1b  The magnitude of interdependence is likely greater for larger, positive IRAP 
values, ceteris paribus. 
 
H2b  Interdependence asymmetry is likely greater for larger, positive IRAP values, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
                                                 
11 As producers’ exchange partners are often companies, interviewing employees of each to determine an 
IRAP score seems impractical.  We assume that these companies are likely risk-seeking, or at least risk-
neutral, but not risk-averse.    17
Furthermore, as relative power may be partially due to a greater ability to handle 
uncertainty, the allocation of uncertainty depends on the dyad members’ relative 
perceptions and attitudes toward risk (i.e., their IRAP values).
12 We hypothesize that 
 
H3  Perceived uncertainties will likely be allocated to dyad members with relatively 
smaller (i.e., less positive or more negative) IRAP values, ceteris paribus. 
 
While we discuss uncertainty using transaction cost, interdependence, and risk behavior 
theories, asset specificity can only be considered in terms of the first two theories.  
Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995) show that greater interdependence lowers conflict 
and induces higher trust and stronger commitment, including parties’ willingness to 
invest in the relationship. Credible commitments (e.g., specific investments) are 
associated with higher interdependence (Buchanan, 1992) and serve to strengthen ties 
between trade partners (Williamson, 1985, and Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp, 1995). 
Furthermore, higher asset specificity is related to increased vertical coordination 
(Mahoney, 1992). Hence, we offer the following hypothesis 
 
H4a  High (low) magnitudes of interdependence engender high (low) levels of asset 
specificity, and vice-versa, ceteris paribus. 
 
                                                 
12 Though we recognize that risk attitude and ability to manage risk are not the same concept, we expect 
that a channel member with low ability to manage risk will be unlikely to be risk-seeking.   18
Similarly, from Gundlach and Cadotte (1994) we can infer that the relatively dependent 
party will invest more heavily in assets specific to the relationship, enhancing total 
interdependence and the disparity in relative interdependence. Thus, we hypothesize 
 
H4b  Greater (lower) interdependence asymmetry induces higher (lower) relationship-
specific investment by the relatively dependent party and vice-versa, ceteris 
paribus.  
The integration of transaction cost, interdependence, and risk behavior theories provides 
no clear expectation regarding how equitably decision rights and gains from trade are 
allocated among members of channels exhibiting little vertical coordination. Low 
magnitudes of interdependence are associated with less vertical integration than higher 
magnitudes of interdependence. At high magnitudes of interdependence, the allocations 
of decision rights and of gains from trade may differ with the extent of interdependence 
symmetry or asymmetry. When interdependence is of high magnitude and is also 
symmetric, cooperation is in the best interest of both parties to exchange and the relative 
bargaining power between them is equal, suggesting equitable allocations of decision 
rights and of gains from trade. Hence, we hypothesize that  
 
H5a  High interdependence magnitude and symmetry induce equitable allocations of 
decision rights, ceteris paribus.  
 
H5b  High interdependence magnitude and symmetry induce equitable allocations of 
gains from trade, ceteris paribus.    19
Conversely, when interdependence is of high magnitude and is also asymmetric, the 
potential for conflict is higher (Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994). The relatively powerful 
party may coordinate exchange activities, using coercion to gain compliance (i.e., 
cooperation) from the dependent party. In other words, the allocation of property rights to 
decisions bearing on the relationship will be one-sided. Similarly, the gains from trade 
may be allocated less equitably when interdependence is of high magnitude and is also 
asymmetric.  Hence, we hypothesize that 
 
H6a  High interdependence magnitude and asymmetry induce inequitable allocations of 
decision rights, ceteris paribus.  
 
H6b  High interdependence magnitude and asymmetry induce inequitable allocations of 
gains from trade, ceteris paribus.  
 
3. Research Context 
 We plan to test the validity of the proposed conceptual model within the context of the 
highly coordinated poultry industry and less coordinated grain industry, and identify the 
hog industry as another promising research context for future study. Nearly all poultry, 
turkey, and eggs in the U.S. are produced under contract or vertical integration (Ménard 
and Klein, 2004). While egg production is highly vertically integrated, poultry and turkey 
production primarily rely on production contracts. U.S. hog production was 
predominantly characterized by market transactions prior to the competitive pressures 
from vertically integrated systems introduced by former tobacco producers from North   20
Carolina, which induced vertical coordination of production in Iowa (Cozzarin and 
Westgren, 2000).
13 Approximately 72% of U.S. hog production was sold through 
marketing contracts in 2001 (Ménard and Klein, 2004). Production and transformation 
processes in these industries are increasingly mechanized and subject to quality standards 
that require specialized equipment. The transaction cost literature identifies that such 
specialized investments yield potential “hold-ups” that may be mitigated via contract or 
vertical integration.   
The tighter coordination of egg, poultry, and turkey production may be due to the 
extent of physical asset specificity that stems from perishability, site, and temporal 
specificity (Ménard and Klein, 2004). In contrast, marketing contracts appear to 
effectively mitigate opportunism in the pork industry, where site and temporal 
specificities are lower (i.e., hogs may be transported further with less degradation and 
slaughter age is of less importance).  
While contract production and vertical integration is common in U.S. livestock, 
broilers, turkeys, fruits, vegetables and dairy industries, such coordination is sparse, 
though increasing, in grain production (Lajili, et. al., 1997).
14 According to Stern and 
Reve (1980), “Typically, competitive, price-mediated mechanisms are dominant in those 
market transactions where information is relatively complete and products are 
undifferentiated, as in soybean trading” (p. 55). However, some new contracting 
alternatives require producers to invest in specialized equipment, influencing vertical 
                                                 
13 Stern and Reve (1980) note that the initiative for innovations in channel design may come from outsiders, 
who are at odds with existing norms.  Thus, innovations result, in part, because of functional conflicts 
within existing channels. 
14 The decoupling of price protection and production, as reflected in the 1996 farm bill, and increasing 
processor interest in input characteristics drive the increasing vertical coordination of grain production 
(Lajili, et. al., 1997).   21
coordination decisions (Lajili, et. al., 1997). Channel members consider the risk-return 
trade-offs of potential contracts.  Hence, “Farmers’ choices may also depend on their risk 
attitudes and financial positions” (Lajili, et. al., 1997, p. 264).  
 
4. Proposed Empirical Design 
4.1 Data Collection and Measures 
Much of the empirical work in past research used a survey instrument, experiments, or 
both to collect primary data from channel members. We plan to conduct a personal 
computer guided interview with 50 producers in both poultry and grain marketing 
channels to measure the constructs of the proposed model. The computer-guided 
interviews will consist of survey questions that measure channel members’ dependence 
(to calculate interdependence magnitude and asymmetry), asset specificity, cash flow 
uncertainty, the allocation of uncertainty, and the underlying constructs for the allocation 
of decision rights by asking producers about their risk management practices. In addition, 
the computer-guided interview will contain two experiments to measure the producers’ 
risk attitudes and risk perceptions. Furthermore we plan to collect secondary industry 
data and government based data. Below we describe in detail how we measure each 
construct. Sample items of operational measures are given in Table 1. 
Cash Flow Uncertainty. Adopting Anderson and Schmittlein’s (1984) measure of volume 
uncertainty, we proxy cash flow uncertainty by asking producers how much (in 
percentage terms) they think sales could vary from their expected amount. In addition, 
following Levy (1985), we use the variance in the error term from the regression of the 
log of sales on time to measure cash flow uncertainty.    22
IRAP. The IRAP is measured indirectly; first we have to measure the channel member’s 
risk attitude and risk perception. The interval technique is used to elicit risk perceptions 
by revealing producers’ cumulative probability distributions regarding output and input 
prices. Channel members’ utility functions are assessed by the certainty equivalence 
method using experiments in which channel members make choices that reflect their real 
business decisions, reducing response bias (Pennings and Garcia 2001).  
Interdependence magnitude. The total magnitude of interdependence is the sum of a 
producer’s and his/her trade partner’s irreplaceability from the producer’s perspective 
(Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994). 
Interdependence asymmetry. Interdependence asymmetry is calculated as the difference 
between the producer’s and his/her trade partner’s irreplaceability from the producer’s 
perspective (Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994).   
Asset Specificity. Following Caves and Bradburd (1988), we ask producers to indicate the 
potentially sunk investments that they have made into the relationship with their primary 
trade partner to measure physical, human, and locational asset specificity. 
Allocation of uncertainty. The allocation of uncertainty will be measured by asking 
producers to report the extent to which the (contractual) relationship with their primary 
trade partner transfers risk from the producer to its partner.  
Allocation of decision rights. Dwyer and Oh’s (1988) concepts of centralization, 
formalization, and participation are adopted to measure the allocation of decision rights.  
Allocation of gains from trade. We measure the allocation of gains as the ratio of 
producer’s return on equity, to the industry return on equity for the processor. The 
producer’s return on equity will be obtained from farm records if the producer is part of   23
the Illinois farm panel data set, or will be based on self reported data (i.e., will be asked 
in the survey). The industry return on equity will be obtained from secondary industry 
and governmental sources. 
With the exception of variables calculated directly from accounting data, the 
variables in our analysis are latent, meaning that these constructs can only be measured 
indirectly with error by indicators (i.e., observable variables). The indicators will be 
examined for clarity and appropriateness in personally administered pre-tests with 
producers. Producers will be asked to complete a questionnaire and indicate any 
ambiguity or other difficulty experienced in responding to questions (i.e., indicators) and 
to make any suggestions they deem appropriate.  Some indicators may be eliminated or 
modified, and new indicators may be developed, based on producer feedback.  The 
resulting set of indicators will be administered in the large-scale producer interview.  
Using structural equation modeling, the (psychometric) measurement quality of our 
constructs will be assessed by confirmatory factor analysis (Hair, et al.). 
 
4.2 Empirical Model: Structural Equation Modeling 
Using a linear regression framework to estimate the relationships between and among our 
variables may result in biased regression coefficients, since many of these variables are 
latent constructs, and hence measured with error. Covariance structure models (often 
referred to as structural equation models) permit explicit modeling and estimation of 
errors in measurement (Bollen, 1989, 1996). Covariance structure models provide a 
method for estimating structural relationships among latent constructs and for assessing   24
the validity with which those constructs have been measured. Following Pennings and 
Leuthold (2000), the covariance structure model can be expressed as 
  ς ξ η η + + = Γ B  (1) 
  ε η + Λ =
y y  (2) 
  δ ξ = Λ =
x x . (3) 
Equation (1) is the latent variable or structural model that expresses the hypothetical 
relationships among the constructs. The m×1 vector η  contains the latent endogenous 
constructs. Nearly all of the latent variables are endogenous in our framework (Figure 2).  
The only latent exogenous construct, exposure to cash flow risk (uncertainty), is 
represented by the n×1 vector ξ . The coefficient matrix B  denotes the effects of 
endogenous constructs on each other, while the coefficient matrix  Γ  denotes the effects 
of exogenous on endogenous constructs. The vector of disturbances ς  represents errors 
in equations. Equations (2) and (3) are factor-analytic measurement models that tie the 
constructs to observable indicators (Figures 2 and 3). The p×1 vector y contains measures 
of endogenous constructs. The q×1 vector x contains measures of endogenous constructs. 
The coefficient matrices 
y Λ and 
x Λ relate y to η  and x to ξ , respectively, with 
measurement errors represented by the vectors of disturbances ε  and δ . The 
measurement model for our dependent variables is depicted in Figure 3, while Figure 2 
contains the structural model, including the measurements for explanatory, but not 
dependent, latent variables. Table 1 identifies the operational measures of latent variables 
employed in our analysis.      
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4.2 Estimation Procedure 
Estimation of the covariance structure model involves finding values for the parameter 
matrices that produce an estimate of the covariance matrix that is as close as possible to 
the sample matrix (e.g., the covariance matrix of the raw data).  The covariance structure 
can be estimated by one of the full information methods: unweighted least squares, 
generalized least squares, and maximum likelihood.  We will employ a maximum 
likelihood procedure, because of its attractive statistical qualities (Bollen, 1989). 
 
5. Conclusions and Discussion 
Transaction cost, interdependence, and risk behavior theories have contributed to our 
understanding of marketing channel formation, each from its own perspective. The 
differences and similarities in the concepts employed by each provide the basis for 
integrating the theories to formulate a more comprehensive model of market channel 
formation. For instance, a key concept in transaction cost and interdependence theories is 
uncertainty, which can easily be related to Pennings and Wansink’s (2004) interaction of 
risk attitudes and risk perceptions (IRAP) concept. Transaction cost and interdependency 
theories identify that uncertainty may be important in channel formation. Yet, these 
theories do not explain how channel members’ perceptions and attitudes toward 
uncertainty impact their actions, and in turn, the channel structure. The IRAP concept 
bridges this gap by providing insight into how channel members respond to uncertainty.  
We hypothesize that the proposed conceptual model, by integrating the drivers of 
market channel structure from each theory, is able to explain the heterogeneity in the 
structure of trade relationships. Furthermore, we hypothesize that the conceptual model   26
may be helpful in understanding how channel structures change over time within the 
specific context of the highly coordinated broiler industry and the generally less 
coordinated grain industry.  
  We plan to validate the conceptual model, using primary data collected via 
personal computer-guided interviews with poultry and grain producers, and secondary 
data on producer and industry return on equity from industry and government sources, as 
well as a panel dataset on Illinois grain producers. We plan to use data from only one side 
(i.e., the producer) of the dyadic trade relationship, but recognize that similar information 
from the other trade partner (i.e., the processor) would be insightful (Geyskens, et. al., 
1996). Collecting data from decision-makers in the companies that producers trade with 
is often problematic. In addition, the interpretation of IRAP values elicited from 
companies’ employees can be difficult (Pennings and Garcia, 2004).  
Although we focus on poultry and grain industries for the purpose of exposition, 
we expect the proposed model to have validity in other industries, including those outside 
of agriculture.  However, differences in government policies and regulations and the 
observed heterogeneity in market channel structures across agricultural industries make 
them particularly interesting research contexts. The proposed model, when taking the 
political environment into account, may help to explain how changes in these policies and 
regulations have impacted the evolution of marketing channels. 
Lajili, et. al., (1997) expect increasing processor interest in input characteristics 
and the decoupling of price protection and production, as reflected in the 1996 farm bill, 
to increase the vertical coordination of grain production. Within the context of the 
proposed model, less price protection exposes producers to higher uncertainty or risk,   27
which may make them more dependent on processors that can absorb risk. Processors 
that require specific input characteristics become increasingly dependent on producers 
that are willing to invest in specific assets (e.g., grain with specific traits), that have low 
salvage value.  As the total magnitude of interdependence between them increases, higher 
vertical coordination is expected. The distribution of decision rights and gains from trade 
depends on the direction of interdependence asymmetry (i.e., the relative dependence of 
the producer and processor). Further, the actual effect of increased uncertainty on 
producers’ risk behavior depends on their IRAP values.  
The rich and diverse literature on marketing channels and the important changes 
occurring in marketing channel structures suggests the opportunity and need for further 
research in this area. While we attempt to integrate transaction cost, interdependence, and 
risk behavior theories to explain market channel structure, empirical validation of the 
proposed model is still needed. As the proposed model only accounts for the political and 
social environment (e.g., the impacts of legislation and social welfare groups on 
agricultural channels) indirectly, future research that directly examines the influence of 
these environmental factors and their interaction with the key constructs in the model is 
worthwhile . Second in the proposed model we assume that each channel member’s risk 
attitude is constant, and hence, does not change across the outcome (e.g., price) domain. 
Pennings and Smidts (2003), applying Tversky and Kahneman’s (1979) prospect theory, 
showed that a particular segment of producers have S-shaped utility functions, implying 
that these producers have a reference point that causes their risk attitude to change over 
the outcome range (in their study price).  Future research may add insight regarding how 
producers respond to uncertainties in the domains of gains and losses by accounting for   28
reference points when measuring producers’ IRAP values. Mahoney (1992) showed how 
transaction cost and agency theories may be integrated to explain vertical integration. 
Hence, incorporating agency theory concepts within the proposed conceptual model may 
be another avenue for future research.  
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Table 1. Summary of measures. 
Construct     Operational Measure*                               
Cash Flow Risk Exposure  = ξ1    x 1 = Unexpected variance in sales (a proxy).             
        Accounting data: The variance in the error term from the regression of the log of sales on time.     
        Scale: By how much (in percentage terms) do you think sales (cash flows) could vary from your expected amount.     
                 
IRAP = η1      y1 = (risk attitude × risk perception). Elicit risk attitudes and risk perceptions with certainty equivalent and interval techniques, respectively. 
     
Interdependence Magnitude = η2   y2 = The sum of producer’s and processor’s irreplaceability taken from the producer’s perspective. 
Interdependence Asymmetry = η3   y3 = The difference between producer’s and processor’s irreplaceability taken from the producer’s perspective. 
  Producer's irreplaceability      Scale: There are other producers who could provide your trade partners with comparable products.      
  Trade partner's irreplaceability      Scale: There are alternative buyers to whom you could deliver in your area.           
                 
Asset Specificity = η4   y4 = Potentially sunk investments.                   
                   
  Physical      Scale: The extent to which you have invested in equipment that would not be as valuable in a relationship with another trade partner. 
  Human      Scale: Your primary trade partner considers your understanding of its input needs and/or operating/trade procedures key to the relationship. 
  Locational      Scale: Your primary trade partner values the close location of your production operations for its timely delivery of inputs.   
        Scale: The distance you must travel to deliver your product plays a role in your choice of a primary trade partner     
       
Allocation of Uncertainty = η5   y 5 = Contract characteristic or type.           
      Scale: The contract with my primary trade partner limits my exposure to risk.           
        Scale: The contract with my primary trade partner transfers risk that I would otherwise face to my partner.       
        Scale: The type of contract I enter into is most closely categorized as spot transactions, forward-price, fixed price, etc….      
                  
Allocation of Gains from Trade = η6   y6 = Calculated as the ratio of producer's profit (in terms of return on equity) to the industry return on equity for the processor.  
  Producer’s return on equity      Accounting data:  Illinois farm panel-dataset and asked during computer-guided interviews.       
  Processor's return on equity     Accounting data:  Datasets from industry and governmental sources.           
                   
Allocation of Decision Rights = η7   y7 = Centralization, y8 = Participation, y9 = Formalization.          
  Centralization      Scale: My primary trade partner specifies many aspects of my end of the production process.         
        Scale:  I have control over the decisions that affect my level of production.           
  Participation      Scale: My trade partner welcomes and considers my ideas for my production procedures.         
        Scale: My trade partner welcomes and considers my ideas for coordinating our exchange relationship.       
  Formalization      Scale: The relationship with my primary trade partner is governed by written contract.         
 * With the exception of the underlying constructs for the allocation of decision rights variable, in which we follow Dwyer and Oh (1988) using 5-point scales, 
and the third item for the allocation of uncertainty variable, which is categorical, all scales are 7-point Likert with end-poles strongly disagree (1) and strongly 
agree (7). 